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Countries  undergoing  adjustment  have increasingly  found it
difficult  to sustain  cuts  in public  sector  deficits  to match  cuts in
external financing,  thus exacerbating  inflation and financial
disequilibrium. Moreover,  fiscal contraction  has often been
short-term  oriented. Fundamental  fiscal reform involving  a
medium-term  perspective  has been rare.  Given the central
importance  of fiscal issues in adjustment  programs,  however,
greater focus on them is essential if such programs aze to.
succeed.
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This paper, prepared in part as a background  approach to fiscal reform and therefore require a
study for the Bank's Peport on Adjustment  medium-term perspective.
Lending, reviews the experience with pubic  Countries committed to fundamental reform
finance issues under adjustment programs. This  of fiscal and other key policy areas should be
experience shows  that fiscal changes are often  able to avail themselves of external financial
triggered by budget and balance of payment  support that lasts long enough for them to
crises.  As a result, short-term considerations  initiate and sustain the change process.  They
have dominated the policy measures introduced.  must strike a balance between stabilization and
Traditional stabilization policies usually empha-  adjustment.  On the expenditure side, this
size measures aimed at reducing aggregate  includes a much better understanding of and at-
demand.  On the fiscal side, this has implied cut-  tention to compositional changes followed by
backs in public expenditures. There is, however,  reorientation of the expenditure program.  On
growing recognition of the need for more  the revenue side, it entails comprehensive tax
growth-oriented adjustment programs, which  reform designed to reduce distortions, to in-
entail a more comprehensive and durable  crease buoyancy, and to ensure equity.
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics De-
partment.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC20433. Please contact AnnBhalla, room N1-061,extension  60359.
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1.  Public  sector  finances  and related  policies  are  a central  part
of economic  management  and  influence  overall  macroeconomic  performance  as
well as the distribution  of resources  between  the public and private
sectors. There  is a growing  recognition  that the  developing  countries'
efforts  to restore  and  maintain  macroeconomic  stability  with  a reasonable
growth  of output  must include  wide-ranging  fiscal  reforms  covering  not
only  the  size  and  financing  patterns  of government  deficits,  but  also the
structure  of  taxation  and  the  level  and  composition of  public
expenditures. How government  deficits  are financed,  taxes  raised,  and
public  resources  allocated  and utilized  has important  consequences  for
incentives,  distribution  and  growth.
2.  The broad  objectives  this paper  are to examine  the role  of
fiscal  reform  in adjustment  programs  and to draw out the experience  in
this area,  as well as the major  lessons  that  emerge  for the design  of
fiscal  reform  recommendations  and conditionality  in adjustment  lending.
While  the  scope  of the  paper  is  broad,  the  extent  of the  coverage  of the
issues and countries is highly selective  and, moreover, the country
references  are  more  illustrative  rather  than  exhaustive.  Part  'I focuses
on the  macroeconomic  implications  of fiscal  deficits,  the  extent  to  which
they  have  been reduced  in selected  countries,  the consistency  of fiscal
policy with other instruments,  and the question  of sustainability  of
fiscal  policy  and  growth. Part  III  deals  with  expenditure  policy  issues,
particularly  those  related  to the  level  and  composition  of recurrent  and
public  investment  outlays.  Part IV outlines  the desirable  elements  of-2-
change  in tax  systems  and  the  experience  with reform. The final  section
summarizes  the key  conclusions  and  outlines  the  set  of  fiscal
considerations  appropriate  for inclusion  in growth-oriented  adjustment
programs  and  lending.
II. Macroeconomic  AsRects  of Fiscal  Adjustment
3.  Over the past several years, many developing  countries  have
faced  macroeconomic  imbalances,  both external  and internal,  of varying
degrees. There  are  many reasons  why a country  could face  a problem  of
this nature.  Among them are external  factors  such as terms of trade
shocks, low demand in export  markets,  unanticipated  reduction  in, or
cessation  of, external  capital  flows,  high interest  rates on external
loans,  and inappropriate  domestic  economic  policies  and mismanagement.
Often  a combination  of these  factors  is at work.  Unless  the  underlying
source  of disequilibrium  is  temporary,  in  which  case  external  capital,  if
available,  could  be used to cover  the  resource  shortfall,  adjustment  so
as to restore  macroeconomic  stability  and revive  growth  is necessary.
Depending on the source of macroeconomic  disequilibria,  the path of
adjustment  and  the  ease  with  which  it  can  be carried  out  may  vary.
4.  Large  public  sector  deficits,  or,  more generally,  inappropriate
expenditure  and  revenue  policies,  are  an  important  source  of
macroeconomic  disequilibrium  in many  developing  countries. An economic
crisis  can  be generated  by heavy  expenditures  on subsidies,  transfers  to
loss-producing public enterprises, or ambitious public investment
programs.  Attempts  to restore economic stability often  require
adjustments  in fiscal  policy.-3-
5.  If adjustment  is  necessary,  how  much  of it should  take  place  in
the public  sector  as opposed  to the private  sector?  How much of the
adjustment  should  be in the form of aggregate  demand  restraint  and  how
much should  come from efforts  to increase  supply?  In the  case of the
former, i.e., reduction in aggregate  demand,  the need to reduce  the
budget deficit which is an indicator  of the excess demand pressure
exerted  by the  public  sector  on the  economy  is  obvious. At one  extreme,
the  approach  may  be to  view fiscal  policy  as primarily  an instrument  for
expenditure  reduction,  and to r.sly  on other instruments  such as the
exchange  rate and pricing  to shift expenditures  and resources  towards
tradeable  goods--expenditure  switching.  But, the magnitude and the
manner  in which the budget  deficit  is reduced,  and the consistency  of
other  policies  with  fiscal  policy  significantly  affect  the  ability  of the
economy  to increase  output  and  thereby  diminish  need to cut  demand,  and
consequently  affect  as well the sustainability  of fiscal  changes.  The
availability  of external  finance  to smooth  the  process  of reform  is,  of
course,  a key  factor.
6.  Ha  fiscal  adjustment  been  enough  in  relation  to the  decline  in
external  financing  that  has  been  experienced  by  many  developing  countries
in  recent  years? If  not,  how  have  budget  deficits  been financed  and  what
are the implications  for the economy  of alternate  financing  packages?
Has fiscal  policy  "crowded-in"  or "crowded-out"  the  private  sector  and
thereby  affected  the sustainability  of reform? An attempt  is made to
answer  these  questions,  in  a  preliminary  way,  in the  rest  of this  section
along  with  a  broad  assessment  of Bank-Fund  conditionality  on macro  fiscal
issues, and a discussion  of consistency  of fiscal  policy  with other
instruments  of adjustment.- 4  -
Fiscal  Deficit  Adjustment:  The  Experience  and  Implications
7.  Fiscal  policy  forms  a key component  of the policy  package  in
most  adjustment  programs. This is  inevitable  since  fiscal  crises,  in the
form of large  budget  deficits,  have been  diagnosed  as a primary  feature
of external  disequilibria  and macroeconomic  instability in many
developing  countries.  The massive  flow of financial  resources  to the
developing countries in the 1970s, largely recycled oil exporters'
deposits, helped finance (or some may say caused) these deficits.
Foreign  savings  were  used to cover  shortfalls  in public  sector  savings.
But since  1982 (see  Figure  1), these  flows  dried  up as the  enormity  of
the  debt  build-up  was revealed,  exposing  the  underlying  unsustainability
of fiscal  policy  in a large  number  of developing  countries. Moreover,
external conditions deteriorated sharply;  real interest rates rose
dramatically,  oil  and  commodity  prices  fell  and  industrial  country  growth
decelerated reducing export markets.  These factors added to the
deterioration  in economic  performance  and to fiscal  problems.  Heavy
adjustments  were  required  in the budget  deficit and  government
expenditures,  especially  excluding interest  payments which now rose
sharply,  had  to  be cut  sharply.
8.  With the  onset  of the  debt  crises,  the  burden  of debt  servic-  on
the  government  increased  in  many  countries.  This  happened  because  of (1)
higher international  interest  rates, (2) devaluation  which raised  the
foreign  interest  bill in  domestic  currency,  (3)  takeover  of private  debt
by the public sector and (4) increased  domestic borrowing at highCurrent  Account  and  Public  Sector  Deficit
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1/  Unweighted  average  for  33  randomlv  selected  cotmtries.- 6 -
domestic  interest  rates  (Brazil,  Turkey,  Pakistan  and  Malaysia). Table  1
shows  the  declining  shares  of private  non-guaranteed  debt in  medium  and
long term debt which came about  due to reduced  foreign  credit  to the
private  sector  and  the  takeover  of some  oi the  private  debt  by the  public
sector  so as to avoid  problems  of credit-worthiness  which  would  restrict
other  sources  of credit. This  was  particularly  true  in  Latin  America  and
in some countries  in East  Asia.  Note that  in the  case  of Latin  America
there  was a substantial  absolute  decline  in  private  non-guaranteed  debt.
Since  1982,  substantial  reductions  in the  size  of the  fiscal  deficit  have
taken  place  in  a number  of countries  (Figure  1).  However,  the  extent  of
fiscal  deficit  adjustment  has  in  many  cases  been  smaller  than  the  cuts  in
availability  of external  funds.
9.  Trade-offs  in Financing  the  Fiscal  Deficit. The implication  of
a  smaller  reduction  in  the  budget  deficit  than  in  the  current  account  can
be best understood  by looking  at the sources  of financing  the fiscal
deficits.  A fiscal deficit can be financed  in three ways: 1 (a)
external  borrowing  or grants;  (b) domestic  borrowing  from the banking
system;  and  (c)  domestic  borrowing  from  non-bank  sources. A large  fiscal
deficit  creates  problems  in terms  of one or more macroeconomic  targets
depending  on  how it is  financed. Large  external  borrowing  creates  a debt
problem; inflationary financing  leads to high inflation;  and heavy
domestic  borrowing  either  leads  to insufficient  credit  availability  to
the  private  sector  if  eredit  is  allocated  by the  government  and  financial
1/  The  build-up  of arrears  has emerged  in  recent  times  as a significant
fiscal issue.  rhese can be treated as forced borrowing  by the
government  and  can  have  very  damag'ng  impact  on fiscal  credibility  of
the  system.- 7 -
Table  1
Total  Long  Term  Debt  by Region  and  the  Share  A/
of Private  Non-Guaranteed  Debt
(US$  billion)
All  Countries  433.6  556.9  870.7
(17.2)  (18.4)  (10.4)
Africa,  South  of  Sahara  44.1  56.3  88.2
(6.4)  (6.9)  (4.6)
East  Asia  and  Pacific  64.2  88.0  149.1
(18.1)  (19.4)  (13.1)
Latin  America  and  172.4  237.7  351.8
Caribbean  (25.0)  (26.2)  (14.4)
North  Africa  and  46.8  51.4  71.3
Middle  East  (1.3)  (1.6)  (1.8)
South  Asia  33.4  39.4  61.6
(1.1)  (3.3)  (4.4)
High  Debt  Countries  204.1  277.6  414.0
(28.1)  (28.3)  (14.4)
Low Income  Africa  27.0  31.8  46.3
(3.8)  (2.3)  (1.1)
A/  Figures  in  brackets  are  share  of  private  non-guaranteed  in  total.
The  balance  is  public  and  publically  guaranteed.
Source: The  World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables.  1987-88.institutions  controlled  by it  or it  leads  to  high  real  interest  rates  and
less private  sector  credit,  which reduce  private  investment  and future
output growth.  A  large budget deficit can therefore  have adverse
implications  for three  key macroeconomic  targets:  debt, inflation  and
the  growth  rate  of the  economy. 2
10.  The  real  counterpart  of  these  financial  flows  is  the
relationship  between  the  budget  deficit,  foreign  savings  and  net  private
savings. The  budget  deficit  is  equal  to foreign  savings  (current  account
balance)  and the  net savings  of the  private  sector.  If external  flows
are not  forthcoming, the government's  budget deficit must imply a
corresponding  net  private  savings  surplus. This  can  be elicited  by.  high
inflation,  which  acts  as  a tax  on  holders  of money,  or through  high  real
interest  rates  which  could  lower  private  investment  and sometimes  raise
savings.
11.  Large  and  unsustainable  fiscal  deficits  have quite  clearly  been
a  central element in the economic crises faced by many developing
countries.  Government  expenditures  rose sharply  for varied  reasons  in
the 1970's.  In some cases it was the misperception  that a temporary
commodity  boom  was permanent,  in others  it  was the  easy  availability  of
cheap  extert.al  finance. Once  expenditures  rose,  they  were  more  difficult
2.1  For a fuller  exposition  see W. Buiter,  (1985):  "A Guide to Public
Sector Debt and Deficits",  Economic  Policy  1  (November):13-19  and
"Turkey:  External  Debt,  Fiscal  Policy  and  Growth  (1988)",  World  Bank,
Green  Cover  Report.  See  also  World  Develogment  Report.  1988,  for  a
detailed  treatment  of  many  of these  issues.- 9  -
to cut back.  A marked feature of fiscal crises was a rapid prior
expansion  of credit  to the government  or the public enterprises  (See
Table  2).  Five  countries  shown  in the  Table--Argentina,  Malawi,  Nigeria,
Mexico and the Philippines--had  a  large build up of credit to the
governmenc  or the  public  enterprise  sector  prior  to a financial  crises.
Once  the  crises  occurred,  the  credit  squeeze  affected  both the  public  and
the private  sector.  In the case of Malawi  and the Philippines,  where
more recent  data is  available,  the  private  sector  was  affected  much  more
than  the  public  sector  by the  credit  squeeze. Countries  which  restrained
the  growth  of credit  to the  public  sector,  such  as for  example  Pakistan,
Korea  and Indonesia,  appear  to have avoided  those  problems. Both Korea
and  Indonesia  had temporary  problems  in the  early  1980s  again  because  of
excessive  credit  expansion  to the  government  but  adjusted  very  quickly  by
among other things cutting growth of credit to the public sector
drastically.
12.  Internal financing of  the fiscal deficit (as opposed to
borrowing  from abroad)  has increased  particularly  since  1985.  The gap
between  the  public  sector  deficit  and  the  current  accounL  has  widened  and
net private savings  have risen (as seen in Figure  1).  If external
financing  has  declined,  tho  pressure  from  excessive  budget  deficits  falls
on inflation  or on  higher  interest  rates  unless  the  private  sector  can  be
persuaded to hold government  debt at low levels of interest.  High
inflation  and high real interest  rates  are indicators  of the need for
further  fiscal  contraction  in  the  economy. 3 Bringing  inflation  down  to
i./  There  is a growing  literature  on the  various  concepts  of the fiscal
deficit  and  how they  reflect  on the  fiscal  stance  of the  government.
These  are  summarized  in  Box  1.- 10  -
Table 2
Pattern of Growth of Real Domestic  Credit
(Percent  per annum)
1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86
Argentina (1982)*
G  337.2  23.1  320.4  -135.9
PE  98.2  895.4  -185.0  -174.9
PV  58.4  27.1  -27.5  -100.8
Malawi  (1981)*
G  74.6  16.6  12.0  -5.9  9.2  23.0
PE  -7.4  -3.7  -13.0  14.4  20.0  -8.2
PV  -12.2  4.9  4.8  -23.9  -20.8  0.1
Mugria  (1983)*
G  63.4  53.9  43.9  6.9  -7.0
PE  16.2  -13.0  98.5  -34.6  -9.2
PV  17.6  8.4  -1.1  -1.5  -1.2
Mexico (1982)*
G  22.8  113.1  -37.7  -30.1  35.8
PE  33.5  92.1  18.5  9.5  -24.9
PV  . 18.6  -36.5  -48.5  23.4  -1.3
PhiliRRines (1983)*
G  51.3  74.9  14.7  -44.2  -27.5  69.2
PE  5.3  25.3  34.3  -19.4  10.0  -48.2
PV  10.7  5.1  15.3  -50.0  -35.2  -23.8
Pakistan
G,PE  -4.0  19.2  3.2  2.5  -1.4  9.5
PV  10.0  10.8  14.0  7.6  22.2  12.9
Korea (1981)*
G  69.5  18.1  -1.6  0.6  4.5  8.9
PE  21.5  20.5  17.4  -3.9  -4.0  -2.4
PV  10.8  18.6  13.7  10.3  15.0  12.7
Indonesia (1981)*
G  52.3  5.6  -18.1  51.4  6.6
PE  -21.4  11.0  -14.0  -7.4  3.2
PV  21.4  35.6  15.3  23.5  16.3
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics, IMF.
G-Government;  PE-Public Enterprises,  PV-Pri.ate
*  Indicates the year when a major economic crisis  occurred in the country.moderate levels is necessary to reduce uncertainty  and provide the
stable  environment  for  adjustment.  Contrary  to trends  in the  industrial
countries,  inflation  increased  in the  developing  countries  in the  early
1980s  and  has  remained  high (See  Table  3).
Table  3
AVERAGE  ANNUAL  INFLATION
(CPI)
Category  1973-80  1980-84  1985  1986
SAL  Intensive  Countries  15.8  20.9  16.4  15.3
World  12.6  13.3  13.5  8.6
Industrial  Countries  9.9  6.9  4.3  2.4
Developing  Countries  22.6  35.4  47.0  29.8
*  The  SAL Intensive Countries include:  Chile, Colombia, C6te
d'Ivoire,
Jamaica,  Korea,  Malawi,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Philippines,
Thailand,  Turkey,  Zambia. These  countries  received  three  or  more
adjustment  loans  prior  to 1987.
Source: International  Financial  Statistics  and  World  Bank  Reviewed
File.
13.  There  are limits  to both sources  of internal  financing. The
inflation  tax increases  the  cost  of holding  money  so that  the  monetary
base declines. Figure  2 shows  the  marked  declining  trend  in tho  ratio
of money  to GDP in a sample  of high inflation  countries  in contrast  to
its stable  and in some cases increasing trend in low inflation
countries.  Beyond  a certain  level,  with  explosive  inflation  the  revenue
from the inflation  tax  beg;ns  to fall.  This happened  in Argentina  in
1984  when  despite  accelerating  inflation,  the  revenue  from  the  inflation
tax fell.  A  currency  reform  was inevitable.  High inflation  also
increases  the size of the deficit although it might assist  in its
financing.  Under  high  inflation,  tax  revenues  fall  because  of- 12  -
Figure  2:  Index  of  Ratio  of  Honey  to  GDP
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collection lags, 4 tax evasion and lack of indexation  of nominal
interest  expenses  which generally  fully reflect  inflation.  In some
countries the government increased its seignorage  revenues  without
monetary  expansion  by increasing  the  reserve  requirements  on deposits  in
the domestic  banking ,ystem. An increase  in reserve  requirements  was
resorted  to,  for  example,  in  Uruguay,  Mexico  and  Ghana. 5
14.  Some  countries  have  attempted  to impose  price  controls  in a  bid
to control  inflation,  often in the mistaken  belief  that inflationary
expectations  contributed  to  high  inflation.  In Brazil  under  the  Cruzado
Plan,  price  controls  were  put in  place  as  a  vigorous  expenditure  program
was being  undertaken. Real  wages  were increased  by 8% and  with price
controls  public  enterprise  deficits  increased. A consumer  boom eroded
the  trade  surplus  and the  program  collapsed  with  much  higher  inflation
than  before  the  plan  was  put  in  place. 6
iJ  See Tanzi,  V  (1977):  "Inflation,  Lags in Collection  and the Real
Value  of  Tax  Revenues",  IMF  Staff  Papers,  24:  154-67.
i/  For  details  see  Appendix  A, Table  A.l.
£./  See  Cardoso,  E. and  R. Dornbusch  (1987):  "Brazil's  Tropical  Plan",
AER  PaDers  and  Proceedings,  77 (May):  288-92.- 14 -
15.  Countries  which  tried  to finance  large  budget  deficits  through
the sale of public  bonds to the  private  sector  faced  problems  of high
real interest  rates. If the  real interest  rate  exceeds  the  real  growth
of public revenue,  this source  of financing  is unsustainable  as the
growth  of domestic  debt becomes  explosive. The problem  of high real
interest  rates  and explosive  domestic  debt is particularly  acute,  for
example,  in Brazil. 7 In order  to avoid  this problem,  some countries
such  as  Mexico  used  mandatory  sales  of government  bonds  at low  and  often
very  negative  interest  rates  to  raise  finance. Financial  repression  was
used to ensure  that funds  were available  to the  public  sector  at  highly
negative  interest  rates,  eroding  confidence  in the domestic  financial
system  and  leading  in  many  cases  to  capital  flight.
16.  These  problems  are  interconnected  and  ultimately  arose  in those
countries  which did not sufficiently  reduce their budget deficits.
Therefore,  adjustment  policies  were  difficult  to  pursue  in this  unstable
macroeconomic  environment. In  many cases,  confidence  in  the  government
and  the  financial  system  fell  and  investment  ground  to  a  halt. But  this
raises  the  issue  of  what  is  a sustainable  level  of the  budget  deficit  in
relation  to a country's  debt and growth  strategy? Too large  and too
rapid  a cut in the fiscal  deficit  can  also  be costly. If reducing  the
budget  deficit  in order  to contain  debt  and inflation  comes  at a heavy
cost  to growth,  the  sustainability  of reform  is  obviously  in  question. 8
The composition  of public  expenditure  cuts and the effect  of overall
Z/  See  Appendix  A,  Table  A.2.
L/  See  Corbo,  V.,  M. Goldstein  and  H. Khan  eds (1987)  "Growth-Oriented
Adjustment  Programs",  Washington,  D.C.;  IMF/World  Bank.- 15 -
fiscal  policy  on private  savings  and investment  matter  a great  deal.
Before  discussing  these  issues,  however,  it would  be useful  to review
the experience  of the selected  SAL sample  countries  and discuss the
question of consistency  between fiscal policy and other adjustment
instruments.
Fiscal  Deficit  Adjustment  in  SAL  Countries
17.  The  reduction  in the  budget  deficit  follows  the  decline  in the
cur. -t  account  balance  closely  in the  sample  SAL countries  (Figure  3)
upto 1984.  But after 1984, there is again substantial  divergence
between the public deficit  and the current  account  balance implying
increased  pressure on the private sector  to generate  a net savings
surplus.  If anything,  SAL intensive  countries  appear  to have greater
difficulty  in later  years  in controlling  the  fiscal  deficit,  because  of
greater  terms  of trade  shocks  and rising  interest  payments.  Domestic
financing  of the  budget  deficit  rose sharply  in a number  of countries
(Table  4).9  As a result  some  countries  such  as  Zambia  and  Mexico  faced
problems  of  high  inflation  which  in  turn  led  to  higher  deficits;  whereas
others  such as Turkey, 10 Philippines  and Thailand  experienced  high
real  interest  rates.
2/ In  Colombia  (1986)  and  Chile  (1985,  1986)  the  government  reduced  its
domestic  obligations.
1Q/  Turkey's  inflation  rate was also  high but not explosive  averaging
30-40  percent  per  annum  between  1980  and  1986.- 16  -
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Table  4
Bud2et  Deficit  and  its  Financing  in  Selected  SAL  Countries
(%  of  GDP) p/
1222  lS_83  192A  1  1986
Chile  3.5  3.0  4.4  2.6  2.3
(37.1)  (133.3)  (38.6)  (-57.7)  (-56.5)
Colombia  4.4  4.5  4.4  2.6  1.4
(56.9)  %66.2)  (72.1)  (11.6)  (-540.0) /
Cote  d'Ivoire  15.2  9.5  3.8  1.9  1.7
(25.6)  (86.8)  (-73.2)  (-58.6)  (14.3)
Jamaica  12.3  13.7  4.0  3.2  1.7
(1.3)  (27.6)  (40.4)  (51.4)  (151.8)
Korea  3.3  1.0  1.1  1.5  1.6
(60.6)  (30.0)  (54.5)  (60.0)  (7.50)
Malawi*  12.5  10.3  8.9  8.1  12.0
(34.1)  (16.0)  (50.8)  (66.7)  (48.9)
Mexico  17.7  8.4  7.2  9.0  15.6
(124.4)  p  (149.4)  q/ (147.9)  ./  (127.0)  q/  (93.1)
Morocco*  9.5  10.9  6.9  8.4  5.5
(30.6)  (107.0)  p/  (31.8)  (126.8)  p/  (622.2)  P
Pakistan  5.3  7.0  6.0  8.0  7.7
(69.8)  (77.5)  (80.0)  (85.7)  (79.2)
Philippines  4.2  2.0  1.9  1.9  4.5
Thailand  5.7  4.3  4.2  5.0  5.2
(56.8)  (66.7)  (55.8)  (70.5)  (77.8)
Turkey*  1.8  2.6  5.4  2.9  3.2
(N.A)  (73.9)  (63.9)  (132.6)  hI (123.5)  la
Zambia  18.7  8.1  6.6  8.0  28.2
(78.6)  (66.7)  (63.6)  (87.5)  (40.1)
A/  Figures  in  brackets  are  percentage  of  domestic  financing  to  total
deficit.
hi  A negative  number  implies  that  domestic  debt  of the  government  was
being  reduced.
q/  A number  larger  than  100.0  implies  foreign  debt  of the  government  was
being  reduced.
*  Central  government  only.
Source: IMF  and  World  Bank  Data.- 18 -
18.  Table  5  provides  a  more  disaggregated  picture  of  the
relationship  between  the  public  deficit  and the  current  account  of the
balance  of payments. In a majority  of the  cases  an improvement  in the
fiscal  deficit  is associated  with an improved  external  account.  The
exceptions  are Thailand  where the  external  position  showed  improvement
while the budget  deficit increased.  On the opposite  end is Jamaica
where  the  budget  deficit  fell  while  the  external  position  worsened. In
both cases unexpected terms of trade changes explain the divergent
trends in the public sector and external deficits.  In Thailand,
improvements  in  the  terms  of trade,  brought  about  by increases  in  prices
for  Thailand's  exports  and a fall in oil  prices,  reduced  the  external
deficit,  whereas  in  Jamaica  the  fall  in  the  price  of bauxite/alumina  had
a much  larger  adverse  impact  on the  external  account  than  on the fiscal
side.
19.  Fiscal adjustments  in the sample  SAL countries  were on the
whole  not  very different  from  a larger  sample  of developing  countries.
It should  be noted  of course  that  the  larger  sample  includes  many  cases
where  the Fund  has had stand-by,  SAF  or EFF agreements. Between  1982
and 1986 changes  in the budget  deficit  were effected  largely  through
changes  in real  expenditure.  There  was  very  little  increase  in  revenues
(Figure  4).  Real  expenditures  fell  sharply  between  1982  and  1984  (Table
6)  but then  rose  substantially  in  some  countries  such  as  Mexico,  Malawi,
Philippines  and  Zambia  where  economic  growth  was  disrupted  for  a  variety
of reasons,  and  the  adjustment  programs  suffered  severe  setbacks.- 19  -
Table  5
Correlation  of External  and  Fiscal  Positions




Worsening  Mexico,  Pakistan  Pakistan
F  Turkey,  Zambia  Philippines
I  Cote  d'Ivoire
S
C  Jamaica  Chile,  Colombia
A  Korea,  Malawi
L  Mexico,  Morrocco
Improvement  Pakistan
Philippines,  Turkey
Zambia,  Cote  d'Ivoire
A/  Countries  listed  more than  once  indicate  there  was  no uniform
pattern.
Note:  External  refers  to the  current  account  balances,  fiscal  to the
public  sector  deficit.
20.  Malawi's  problems  arose from the combined  effect  of terms  of
trade  deterioration  and the difficulties  it has faced.  in keeping  its
lines of communication  open.  As a result  of terms  of trade  losses,
imports had  to be curtailed and revenue from import duties fell.
Company  taxes  also  registered  a drop  as economic  activity  was  curtailed.
At the  same  time  expenditures  rose  sharply  reflecting  increased  military
expenditures  and  a  general  lack  of  budgetary  monitoring  and  discipline.
21.  The sharp drop in the price of copper  and the government's
inability  to control  expenditures  are the primary  causes  of Zambia's
financial crisis.  As the exchange  rate was devalued, the rising
domestic currency costs of debt repayment led to further fiscal
deterioration. Subsequently, the government suspended the reformFigure  4
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1/ Unweighted  average  for:  Chile,  Colombia,  Cote  d'Tvoire,  Jarnaica,  Korea,  Malawi,
Merico,  Morocco,  Pakistan.  Philippines,  Thailand,  Turkey,
Zaubia- 21  -
Table  6
Public  Sector  ExDenditure  and  Its  Composition
(Percent  of  GDP)
Country  Current  Cagital  Total  Countrv  Current  Capital  Total
Chile  Mexico
1982  31.9  4.7  36.6  1982  37.6  9.9  47.5
1984  30.7  6.4  37.1  1984  32.7  7.5  40.2
1986  27.1  7.7  34.8  1986  40.6  5.8  46.4
Colombia  A/  Morocco  a/
1982  8.9  3.8  12.7  1982  23.4  11.9  35.3
1984  9.7  2.7  12.4  1984  23.9  8.7  35.3
1986  9.5  2.3  11.8  1986  22.8  4.2  27.0
Cote  d'Ivoire  Pakistan
1982  26.5  15.2  41.7  1982  14.4  7.7  22.1
1984  27.3  8.0  35.3  1984  17.8  6.1  23.9
1986  26.7  6.3  33.0  1986  18.0  6.9  24.9
Ghana  Philippines  _/
1982  - - - 1982  9.1  3.0  12.1
1984  8.6  2.5  11.1  1984  8.0  1.9  9.9
1986  11.9  6.1  18.0  1986  10.6  2.1  12.7
Jamaica  Thailand  a/
1982  29.8  12.5  42.3  1982  15.0  4.5  19.5
1984  28.2  5.8  34.0  1984  15.4  3.7  19.1
1986  26.4  7.5  33.9  1986  16.4  3.7  20.1
Korea  Turkey
1982  16.4  6.5  22.9  1982  10.9  12.2  23.1
1984  15.4  6.1  21.5  1984  8.9  10.0  18.9
1986  16.2  6.1  22.3  1986  8.8  14.1  22.9
Malawi  Zambia
1982  21.0  11.2  33.2  1982  32.3  2.8  35.1
1984  21.6  8.2  29.8  1984  26.4  2.5  28.9
1986  24.6  7.8  32.4  1986  41.9  6.3  48.2
-/  Central  Government  Only.
Source: World  Bank  Data.- 22  -
program.  Terms of trade losses due to a weakening  oil market and
inability to rein in expenditures  were also a major factor in the
difficulties  Mexico  faced  in  its  adjustment  program.  In
Philippine.,the deterioration in the fiscal  accounts from 1985-86
onwards  reflects  large  losses  on  poorly  selected  private  sector  projects
financed  with loans  and guarantees  from  public  financial  institutions
whose  losses  were  then  covered  by the  government.
22.  A  common feature in the difficulties faced by  all these
countries  was a large  budget  deficit  in  relation  to the  availability  of
external  inflows  and  domestic  savings  as well  as the inability  to plan
for and deal with higher  interest  payments  and the changes  in their
terms of trade.  High budget deficits  are also prevalent in some
countries such as Pakistan but have not yet led to macroeconomic
instability. This is due partly  to Pakistan's  ability  to draw down
accumulated  foreign  reserves  and at the risk of accumulating  a large
domestic  debt  whose  impact  will  be felt  in  the  future.
Consistency  of Fiscal  Policy  with  other  Measures
23.  Consistency between various components of the adjustment
program  is  a major  concern  in  the  design  of adjustment  programs. Almost
every component  of an adjustment  program  has fiscal  implications. In
particular,  exchange  rate and trade  policies,  financial  liberalization
and  price liberalization  in selected  sectors  have large  effects  on the
budget.  Unless these effects are anticipated and appropriately- 23  -
incorporated  into fiscal  programming,  their  impact  through  the budget
can sometimes  be destabilizing  and disruptive,  possibly  leading  to a
collapse  of the  program  and  policy  reversals.
24.  The need to get consistency  between  the  Fund and the  Bank on
some  of these  issues  is  another  complicating  factor. In several  of the
early  loans,  difficulties  in coordination  of policies  arose  due to the
desire  of  both institutions  not  to impinge  on each  other's  jurisdiction.
Lately,  the  Bank  has found  it necessary  to take  a more active  role in
exchange  rate and fiscal  policy  in order  to achieve  better  consistency
in its adjustment  programs.  At the same time the Fund is planning
greater  emphasis  on the  medium-term  effects  of its  programe.
25.  Fiscal  and  Exchange  Rate  Policies. Consistency  between  fiscal
and exchange  rate  policies  is  a major  issue  in the  design  of adjustment
programs.  In general,  the need for coordination  between the two is
obvious. Devaluation  is unlikely  to  be effective  unless  accompanied  by
appropriate  reductions  in demand  management  policies,  including  a tight
budget.  This would  reduce aggregate demand and imports, thereby
lowering the pressure on the current account.  Without appropriate
fiscal restraint,  the real effective  devaluation  is quickly eroded,
inflation  increases  with little  resource  allocation  effects.
26.  Coordination  between  exchange  rate  and  fiscal  policy  can  become
complex since exchange  rate changes affect the size of the budget
deficit. With  a nominal  devaluation,  the  base  for  customs  duties,  which
form  a substantial  share  of revenue  in  many  developing  countries,  is  now
evaluated  at a more favorable  exchange  rate.  The revenue from this- 24 -
source  would  increase  unless  the  government  reduces  tariff  rates  by the
extent  of the  devaluation. Export  incomes  rise  and  government  revenues
will increase  either from higher export taxes or through increased
profits or reduced  losses  of state-owned  enterpriaes. Public  sector
corporations  with access  to the overvalued  foreign  exchange  would now
lose  heavily,  and  may need large  supporting  transfers  from the  budget.
Typical  examples  would  be power  authorities,  or the  agencies  which  runs
the  food  subsidy  system.
27.  On the  loss side,  an increasingly  important  component  would  be
the domestic  currency  counterpart  of foreign  debt service  which  would
now  rise  in direct  proportion  to the  devaluation.  In a large  number  of
developing  countries,  devaluation  has resulted  in a marked  rise in che
local currency  equivalent  of foreign  interest  payments  (see  Table 7,
Section  III). Moreover,  an important  consequence  of  devaluation  (real),
often  ignored,  is its impact  on revaluation  of existing  external  debt.
In general,  if including  debt service  the  government  is a net importer
of tradeable  goods and services  it will lose net revenues  through  a
devaluation.  The assessment  of the impact  of devaluation  on the  budget
can be quite complicated  if there  are multiple  exchange  rates.  The
government  then  receives  and  allocates  foreign  exchange  at  various  rates
to  different  entities  in  the  economy.
28.  If the impact  of devaluation  is likely  to be adverse  on the
budget,  it may be counterproductive  to recommend  a free float  of the
currency  (such  as an exchange  auction). Movements  in the  exchange  rate
and the budget deficit may reinforce  each other in a destabilizing
manner  as  happened  in  the  case  of  Zambia,  Sierra  Leone  and  Bolivia  where- 25 -
black market  premia  accrued  to the government  before the devaluation
and, correspondingly,  the fiscal  situation  deteriorated  following  the
devaluation. 11 In this  case,  a series  of  managed  exchange  rate  changes
programmed  with  an  overall  reduction  in  the  budget  deticit  may  be a  much
safer alternative;  with some priority  in sequencing  given to deficit
reduction.
29.  Consistency  with  Other  Policies. Consistency  issues  also  arise
with respect to trade policy.  The first stage of the Bank's  trade
reform recommendations  usually  involve  a shift from QR's to tariffs
which  improve the fiscal position of the government.  Subsequent
reductions  in the  tariff  rate involve  the  need for  compensating  fiscal
measures.  In general the Bank's tariff  reform  recommendations  have
focussed  on this problem.  The danger  arises  when governments  do not
implement  compensatory  fiscal  measures,  which  then can lead to policy
reversals  as  happened  in  the  case  of  Morocco.
30.  Sectoral  price liberalization  usually  benefits  the government
budget.  In many cases the benefit comes from a decline in state
enterprise losses.  However, if a sector is a net taxpayer,  price
decontrols  can have  adverse  fiscal  impact. This is often  the  case for
the agricultural  sector  where prices paid to farmers are kept low
through export taxes and below market procurement  prices.  Price
increases  to the farm sector  unless  compensated  by removal  of input
subsidies  affect the budget.  A comprehensive  price liberalization
1J/  See Brian Pinto  (1987):  "Black Market Premia, Exchange Rate
Unification  and  Inflation  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa",  Mimeo,  World  Bank,
Washington,  DC.- 26  -
involving  several  sectors  would  have less  problems  as the  government's
losses  in one sector  would  be made  up by gains  in others. Individual
sector  adjustment  loans  would,  however,  need  to  direct  attention  on this
issue.
31.  An issue  of great  concern  to  many  governments  is the  short-run
inflationary consequences of price  liberalization--the  release of
repressed inflation. 12 The predominant approach to assessment of
inflation  in  adjustment  programs  is  a straightforward  macroeconomic  one,
that  runs through the relationship between fiscal deficits, the
financial  program  and  targetted  inflation  rates. However,  the  immediate
burst in prices following  decontrol and liberalization  can lead to
policy  reversals  if the impact  of deficit  reductions  on inflation  takes
effect over a longer period.  This is often a key reason for the
reluctance  of many  countries  to adopt  Bank/Fund  programs. Much greater
care is needed  in coordination  of public  enterprise  price  policy  and
fiscal  policy.
Fiscal  Deficits.  Public  Sector  Size  and  Growth
32.  Longer  term structural  adjustment  questions  deal with issues
about the role and the relative  size of the public  sector.  Long-run
trends indicate  that the size of the public sector increases  with
ja/ See for an empirical illustration:  Feltenstein, A  and  Ziba
Farhadian (1987) "Fiscal  Policy, Monetary  Targets and the Price
Level  in a  Centrally  Controlled  Economy:  An Application  to the  Case
of China",  Journal  of  Money.  Credit  and  Banking  19,2  (May):  137-56.- 27 -
economic  development. 13 Contrary to a widespread belief, the
government  dominates  to a far greater  extent  resource  mobilization  and
its allocation  in the more developed  countries.  On the expenditure
side, richer  countries  appear  to spend a lot more on health, social
security  and  welfare. On the  revenue  side  the  more  developed  an economy
the  more  revenue  (as  a share  of GNP) it  collects  from  income  and  wealth
taxes,  social  security  contributions  and domestic  indirect  taxes.  The
only  category  which  declines  with  development  is taxation  on
international  trade. Governments  also  play a supporting  or restrictive
role through  a myriad  of rules,  procedures  and  regulations. No direct
evidence  on these  is  available. The  notion  that  the  public  sector  has
become  too  large  in  many  developing  countries  cannot  therefore  be based
on historical  trends. Rather,  it emanates  from the  view that in many
developing  countries,  government  expenditure  policies  are  often  wasteful
and budgetary  deficits put excessive pressure on underdeveloped
financial  markets.
33.  In the  adjustment  period  considered  here,  i.e.,  post  1980,  the
adjustment  to lower  budget  deficits  have  come  primarily  from  expenditure
cuts.  Increases  in revenues  have  been difficult  to achieve  especially
since  import  cuts  have led to reductions  in revenue  from import  duties
as for  example  in  Malawi. The expenditure  reductions  have cut  heavily
into public investment (which have faced the largest percentage
j/ See Appendix  A, Figures  A.1 and A.2 for detailed  figures  derived
from Lindbeck,  A. (1986):  "Public  Finance for Market Oriented
Developing  Countries",  Mimeo,  World  Bank.- 28  -
reductions)  and the non-interest  component  of current  expenditure. 14
These  have  affected  social  and  economic  services  and  subsidies,  and  have
major implications  for future  growth 15 and equity  requiring  careful
consideration  of  alternative  policies. The  reduction  in expenditure  has
not always  been rational  and efficient  because  of a variety  of social
and  political  pressures  on the  government.
34.  When a choice  is available  between  expenditure  reduction  or a
revenue  increase  some important  macroeconomic  implications  need to be
kept  in mind.  One example of the differential  impact of revenue
increases  versus expenditure  reductions  is the possibility  that an
increase  in revenues  would  lead  to a reduction  in the  aggregate  sav-ings
rate  of  the  economy. This  is  known  as the  Please  effect  and  arises  from
the proposition  that the public  sector's  propensity  to save is lower
than that of the private  sector. 16 Of course  the opposite  is also
possible. Many Asian  economies  have raised  taxation  to finance  public
investment and  thereby raise savings and investment  rates in the
14/  Detailed  figures  are  provided  in  Section  III.
l_/ In the  SAL  countries  considered,  negative  GDP  per  capita  growth  was
observed  in Jamaica, Malawi, Mexico, Cote  d'Ivoire,  Chile,
Philippines  and Zambia,  between 1980-86.  Only Pakistan,  Turkey,
Thailand,  Korea and Morocco (marginally)  showed  positive  GDP per
capita  growth.
li/  Please,  S., "Savings  Through  Taxation: Reality  or Mirage,  Finance
and  Developmelit,  1967.  For  an empirical  verification  of the  Please
Effect  see Chhibber,  A. (1985):  "Taxation  and Aggregate  Savings:
An Econometric  Analysis  for Three Sub-Saharan  African  Countries",
CPD  Discussion  Paper  1985-35,  Washington,  DC,  World  Bank.- 29 -
economy. However,  a recent  study  shows  a negative 17 correlation  between
GDP  growth  and  the  share  of  public  consumption  in  GDP. The  choices  made
in cutting expenditures  or raising resources  also have wide-ranging
effects  on trade  balances  and  the  distribution  of income. Who  benefits
and  who loses  from  government  expenditure  and the  manner  in which  it is
financed  is a key factor  in the ability  or inability  of the  government
to  undertake  reforms.
35.  Sustainable  Fiscal  Deficits. A related  issue  of  more immediate
concern  is how  much  should the budget  deficit be  cut,  or put
differently,  what is  the  sustainable  level  of the  fiscal  deficit? While
in general  there  are  close  links  between  the  size  of the  fiscal  deficit
and the external  account,  the  nature  of fiscal  conditionality  needs  to
be carefully  assessed  as regards  its  impact  on internal  adjustment.  How
the private  sector  adjusts  to changes  in fiscal  policy  influences  its
impact  on  external  balances. If  a reduction  in the  fiscal  deficit  leads
to lower  private  savings,  its effectiveness  in terms  of lowering  the
current  account  is  reduced. Conversely,  a  country  can  run  higher  budget
deficits  without  affecting  the  current  account  adversely,  if  the  private
sector is willing to generate additional  net savings surpluses at
reasonable  rates  of inflation  and  real  interest  rates,  as is the  case in
Thailand  and  Malaysia. Moreover,  whether  the  improvement  in the  current
account  is  brought  above  by a reduction  in investment  or an increase  in
savings is fundamental  to the medium-term  success  of the adjustment
program. This is  where  potential  conflicts  arise  between  stabilization
11/  B. Balassa  (1988):  "Public  Finance  and Economic  Development"  PPR
Working  Paper  WPS31,  July  1988.- 30 -
and adjustment. There is little  merit in having  a close correlation
between  the  budget  deficit  and  the  external  account  if the  outcome  is a
low level  of savings  and  investment  in the  economy. Thus,  the quality
of fiscal  adjustment  is as important  as the  quantity. The  government's
tax and credit  policy,  and the  composition  of public  expenditures  are
key factors  determining  the  outcome  and  are  addressed  in  more detail  in
Sections  III  & IV.
36.  The 'sustainable'  level  of the  fiscal  deficit  therefore  depends
on a number  of factors  such  as the  cost  and  availability  of external  and
internal  finance,  the quality  and composition  of the public  resource
mobilization  and  use, accompanying adjustment  measures and  the
behavioral  responses  of the rest of the economy.  Turkey  provides  an
interesting  example  of the need to make a careful  assessment  of these
factors in judging the sustainability of fiscal policy.  Turkey
repeatedly  exceeded  Fund fiscal  targets.  Undoubtedly,  the financing
needs  commensurate  with larger  public  sector  deficits  generated  higher
medium  term inflation  and real interest  rates.  But the thrust  of the
program  was  growth-oriented  centering  around  export  performance  and the
ability  to  keep  savings  and  investment  rates  up.  Fiscal  policy  played  a
key role in the process  through  an increase  in a well-directed  public
expenditure  program (and  recommended  by the Bank)  which supported  the
private sector through special  incentives  and credit for export  and
investment and  a  substantial reduction  in the losses  of  state
enterprises.  A key contributing  factor  was  the substantial  excess
capacity  inherited  from the  heavy investments  made in the 1970s  which
allowed  for  a quick  improvement  in output  and  exports  once  the  exchange-31-
rate was aligned.  A recent  study 18 argues  that the cost of a more
conservative  fiscal  policy  on growth  may have been high, in the early
stages  of the  adjustment  program.
37.  Turkey's  fiscal  deficits  were sustainable  upto a point  because
their impact  was growth-oriented. In the last two years additional
increases  in public investment  and rising  interest  payments  on past
borrowing  have led to very high fiscal  deficits  and threaten  macro-
stability,  requiring  corrective  action. The important  point  to  keep in
mind is that as shown in a previous section,  while macroeconomic
stability  is central  to successful  adjustment,  in a period  of sharply
reduced  external  resources,  a country  may  need  to live  with a degree  of
mild inflation  and high interest  rates in order to raise savings  and
growth. This is  especially  true  when  the  economy  is  saddled  with  excess
capacity  and is coming  out of a recession. Designing  an appropriate
growth-oriented  fiscal  policy  will  require  more  careful  country-specific
quantitative  analysis  of the issues  raised  here.  Because,  of the  much
wider  range  of objectives  it considers,  the  Bank  will  need to  take  on a
much  more  active  role  in  the  design  of macro-fiscal  conditionality.
I/  See  R. Anand,  A. Chhibber  and S. van  Wijnbergen  (1988): "External
Balance,  Fiscal  Policy  and  Growth  in  Turkey",  PPR  Working  Paper  No.
WPS86,  August  1988.- 32  -
III. Public  Sector  Resource  Allocation  and  Use
38.  The previous  section  showed  that  stabilization  and adjustment
programs  typically  require  considerable changes  in government
expenditure  policy  aimed  at both reducing  unsustainable  fiscal  deficits
and  enhancing  the growth  and distributional  impact  of public  spending.
In principle,  revenue-increasing  measures  can be used to reduce  the
fiscal deficit.  However, given the difficulties  of increasing  tax
revenues  in the  short  run  and  possible  concerns  about  the  over-expansion
of the  public  Factor  and  "crowding  out"  of  private  activity,  expenditure
reductions  are often heavily  relied  upon to redress  fiscal  deficits.
With reduced or tightly controlled  real public spending, there is
greater  need  to  ensure  that  scarce  public  funds  are  allocated  to  highest
priority  areas  and  used  more  efficiently.
39.  Adjustment  programs  and the Bank's  lending  in support  of them
devote  considerable  attention  to  public  expenditure  issues. Four  broad
areas are generally addressed:  (i) the level and composition  of
recurrent expenditures;  (ii) the  size and  allocation of public
investment;  (iii)  institutional  processes  and  mechanisms  for  budgetting;
and (iv)  the fiscal  consequences  of public  enterprise  operations. Each
of these  areas  are  discussed  in  brief  in  the  remainder  of this  section.
Recurrent  Expenditures
40.  As noted  earlier,  budget  deficit  reduction  is a major  focus  of
the  Fund  standby  and  EFF lending. Inasmuch  as Bank  SALs  have typically
been extended  concurrently  with a Fund  Program,  the  Bank has generally- 33 -
been guided  by Fund conditionality  with respect  to the fiscal  deficit
target  and the  associated  revenues  and  expenditure  indicators. 19 Only
occassionally  do SALs contain  specific  targets  for overall  recurrent
expenditures  (e.g.,  SAL I for Ghana or SAL II for the Philippines).
More  often,  however,  subceilings  or targets  for  particular  components  of
the  current  budget  are specified. These  generally  relate  to subsidies
and  spending  on social  sectors.
41.  Figure  5  shows  the changes  in real expenditures across
functional  sectoral  categories  for 34 developing  countries  (unweighted
average) during 1982-85.  It indicates  cuts in every category  of
expenditure  with the exception  of housing and other social  services.
Increasingly,  there  is  concern  that  budgetary  allocations  for  operations
and maintenance are inadequate.  Based on its detailed sectoral
knowledge,  the  Bank  at times  has set  specific  targets  for  increases  in
O&M  expenditures  in the  belief  that  the  payoff  to such  outlays  would  be
high.  In some  cases,  SALs  have stipulated  a target  for  increased  real
spending on social sectors even when there has been a condition
requiring a  reduction  in the  overall deficit and/or  recurrent
expenditures.
19/  With the advent  of the Structural  Adjustment  Facility  and Policy
Framework  Papers,  there  is,  however,  greater  interaction  among the
Bank  and  Fund  staff  in  devising  and  agreeing  upon  program  targets.Figure  5
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42.  Among the recurrent  expenditure  categories  most often subject
to scrutiny  in adjustment  programs  are subsidies  because  of the large
amounts  that are involved.  Both explicit  and implicit  subsidies  are
covered  and involve  a wide range  of items,  including  foodstuffs. The
relevance,  effectiveness  and costs of the subsidies  are examined. 20
For  most  products,  eventual  elimination  of the  subsidies  involved  should
be a policy  goal.  Where  appropriate,  subsidies  and  cost  recovery  ought
to be handled jointly.  For some items, particularly  foodstuffs,
however, it may be justified to focus on better targetting  of the
beneficiaries  both  to  improve  the  distributional  impact  and
reduce/restrain  the budgetary  outlays.  The Bank's  adjustment  lending
often  contains  conditionality  on the  reduction  in,  and rationalization
of,  subsidies.
43.  Analysis  of recurrent  expenditures  other than those  mentioned
earlier  has received  mueh less attention  in adjustment  programs. The
general  focus  of the  analysis  is  on the  impact  of recurrent  spending  on
resource  use, i.e.,  on public  savings  and investment,  the underlying
notion  being that physical  investment  has higher  priority.  The fact
that  returns  to  some  recurrent  expenditure  can  be  higher  than  returns  to
investment  and that  expenditures  whlch  contribute  to human  capital  are
as important  is  being  increasingly  recognized.
2Q/  See  World  Bank,  Bank  Treatment  og Subsidies,  January  15,  1987.- 36
Public  Investment
44.  A key aspect  of fiscal  adjustment  in many  developing  countries
relates  to the level,  composition  and  institutional  processes  of public
investment.  Resource constraints  often dictate a relatively  sharp
cutback  in the  magnitude  of public  investment  (see  Figure  6 and Table
7), which  generally has  a significant  balance of payments impact
inasmuch  as the  import  content  of such  spending  exceeds  that  of current
expenditures. Within  a reduced  public  investment  program,  priority  is
given  to projects  with shorter  gestation,  higher  rates  of return. Many
developing  countries  have, however, lacked  a systematic  process for
evaluating  public  projects  and for establishing  multi-year  budgetting
requirements.
45.  In recent years, the Bank has carried out numerous public
investment  (or,  sometimes  more  broadly,  public  expenditure)  reviews. A
major objective of these studies has been to strengthen  the Bank's
ability to advise governments on the adjustments  needed in their
investment  programs and how to improve the processes  for planning,
evaluating and monitoring  public projects.  It is, therefore,  not
surprising  that  adjustment  lending,  both SALs  and SECALs,  has embodied
numerous  conditions,  many  of a  qualitative  nature,  on  public  investment. 21
46.  In the  early  phases  of the  adjustment  process,  the  emphasis  is
generally  on scaling  down the  size  of the  public  investment  program  and
shifting  the  focus  away  from  the  manufacturing  sector  to infrastructure
1/  Some 22 Public Investment/Expenditure  Reviews were carried out
during  FY84-86,  nearly  all  serving  as inputs  into  adjustment  loans.I-  6
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Table  7
Comjosition  of Government  Expenditures
(As  %  of Total  Government  Expenditure)
Subsidies
Wages  and  Interest  Capital  and  other  Other
Countrv  Salaries  Pavments  Expenditure  current  transfers  Expenditure
Argentina
1977  . 7.6  40.0  20.0  32.2
1980  . 6.0  20.5  32.5  41.0
1984  . 8.4  17.6  34.8  39.3
Brazil
1978  24.3  8.3  14.9  42.6  9.9
1980  23.0  8.2  12.8  45.9  10.2
1985  17.9  36.3  7.6  29.5  8.7
Chile
1977  35.0  9.6  8.2  36.1  11.2
1980  32.2  2.9  5.4  47.4  12.1
1986  20.3  5.4  11.7  50.5  12.1
Iiidonesia
1977  25.7  3.3  48.1  5.8  17.1
1980  19.6  3.7  50.2  14.9  11.7
1986  20.3  10.0  49.6  10.6  9.6
Korea S/
1977  17.0  4.7  15.8  31.7  30.9
1980  16.0  6.6  14.1  34.2  29.1
1987  13.1  7.9  14.2  37.9  26.8
dexico
1977  . 9.2  22.7  23.4  44.8
1980  . 8.0  35.4  21.3  35.2
1984  . 28.9  23.2  19.9  28.0
Morocco,  /
1977  26.1  3.8  49.4  10.2  10.6
1980  33.1  7.2  31.2  14.7  13.8
1985  33.2  15.9  19.3  15.2  16.5
Pakistan
1977  . 11.1  21.4  15.6  52.0
1980  . 11.9  17.4  23.3  47.4
1985  . 17.0  11.9  15.3  55.9
Thailand  if
1977  22.9  6.5  26.5  15.3  28.7
1980  21.3  7.8  23.2  14.3  33.4
1985  29.0  14.2  19.2  7.8  29.9
Uruguay
1977  34.5  1.4  24.5  37.8  1.9
1980  30.2  1.6  17.3  43.0  7.9
1984  26.6  8.4  16.7  40.8  7.4
Al  Countries  with  data  on central  government  only.
Source: World  Bank  Data.- 39
and  social  sectors. A "core"  investment  program  consisting  of a smaller
number  of projects  which can be completed  speedily  is often devised.
Pakistan  and  Turkey  are  two  countries  where  the  Bank  has  been successful
in persuading  the  government to  increase  the  emphasis  towards
infrastructure (see Figure 7), which has  important complementary
linkages  with private sector  productivity. Some S&Ls contain  highly
specific  quantitative  conditions  on  public  investment.  For  example,  SAL
IV for Turkey  required  that (a) the public  investoent/savings  gap be
limited  to  4.1%  of GNP  in  1983,  (b)  the  1983  growth  of  public  investment
be constrained  to 5.2%  in real terms  as an upper  limit,  and (c)  number
of  projects  in  the  program  be reduced  to 6,600  witl.  85%  of funds  focused
on  112 of  187 large projects.  Generally, however, no  exglicit
quantitative  target for public investment  is put forward in SALs.
Rather,  conditionality  takes  the form of review  and agreement  on the
program  at a specified  time.  It is in  the  course  of the  review  process
that  agreement  is reached  on the  appropriate  slze  and  composition  of the
program.
47.  As the process  of adjustment  and expenditure  compression  has
continued,  there  has been,  however,  concern  about  the insufficiency  of
public  investment,  particularly  for  infrastructural  and  social  sectors.
Thus, some recent adjustment  loans have specified  conditionality  in
terms  of an increase  in,  or a minimum  level  of,  public  investment. SAL
I for Chile and the Reconstruction  Import Credit II for Ghana are
examples. A reduction  in the share  of public  investment  allocated  to
the  manufacturing  sector  so as to free  up resources  for other  sectors
has  been  another  feature  of SAL  conditionality.-40-
Figure  7
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Institutional  Processes  for  Expenditure  Policy
48.  Budgetary  reforms  in  general  and  improvements  in  the  investment
planning  and priority-setting  process  as well as in capital  budgetting
and control  in particular  are  widely  emphasized  in adjustment  programs
and  loans. For  example,  the  Ghana  SAL  I required  that  the  IMF  technical
assistance  recommendations  on budgetting  and expenditure  control  be
implemented.  It also stipulated  further  measures  for strengthening
institutional  capacity for budgetting.  SAL III for C6te d'Ivoire
contained  provisions  for a program  to strengthen  capacity  for project
identification, economic evaluation and  supervision in technical
ministries  as well as the use of "agreed  criteria"  for appraisal  of
economic  and  social  projects. This  focus  on the  institutional  issues  in
the budget area arises  from the belief that expenditure  reforms  are
unlikely to be durable  unless the related  institutional  capacity  is
strengthened. This type  of change  is often  a difficult  one to effect
given the shortage  of skilled  personnel  and government  pay scales  in
most developing countries, and would, therefore,  have to have an
appropriately  long  time  horizon  for  implementation.
Fiscal  Conseguences  of Public  Enterprise  Overations 22
49.  In many developing  countries,  the financial  performance  of
public  enterprises  has a major  bearing  on the  government  budget  and  the
tJ/  This discussion  is limited to fiscal issues only.  A  separate
background  paper treats the issues related  to public enterprise
reform  in  more  depth.- 42 -
allocation of resources between the public and private sectors.
Budgetary transfers to finance the  investment outlays of public
enterprises  or their  operating  losses  often  constitute  a major  drain  on
public  finances. Moreover,  public  enterprise  demands  on resources  are
widely  believed  to "crowd  out"  private  investment.  There  is a general
presumption  that successful  fiscal adjustment  and enhanced overall
economic performance  often requires  not only improved  efficiency  of
public enterprises  but also a reduction in the size of the public
enterprise  sector. These  considerations  are incorporated  in the  design
of the  adjustment  programs  supported  by the  Bank.
50.  Public  enterprise  conditionality  generally  covers  a  broad  range
of issues, including investment  size and its financing,  budgetary
transfers,  pricing,  personnel,  and  divestiture. Sometimes  the targets
relate  to the state  enterprises  as a whole,  while in other  cases,  the
conditions  may pertain to one or a few major enterprises. Explicit
quantitative  conditions  are particularly  common  with respect  to the
investment  level for public  enterprises  and the contribution  of the
general budget to its financing (e.g.,  SAL II for the Philippines;
various  SALs  for  Turkey).
51.  Price and rate increases  constitute  a major area of public
enterprise conditionality.  The intent is to phase out subsidies,
particularly  common  for  petroleum  products,  electricity  and  fertilizers.
Border  pricing  for  petroleum  products  and other  homogeneous  tradeables
is generally  the  rule  followed. Considerable  progress  has  been  made in- 43 -
raising  domestic  petroleum  prices  to international  levels. However,  it
has proved to be more difficult to phase out fertilizer  subsidies
(Pakistan,  Turkey).
52.  The financial  performance  of  public  enterprises,  often  measured
as a rate of return  target  or a given level  of self-financing,  is a
common  focus  of conditionality.  What  seems  to receive  less  emphasis  is
the  possibility  that  price/rate  increases  by public  enterprises  enjcying
market  power  may even  be counterproductive  to efficiency  improvements.
This issue  particularly  arises  in the  context  of electric  utilities  and
other  natural  monopolies. Efforts  to improve  resource  utilization  by
the utility  companies  have proved  elusive  (e.g.,  Bangladesh,  Colombia
and  Indonesia  where  power  "loss"  rates  remain  very  high).
IV.  Reform  of  Taxation
53.  Many developing countries have tax systems which generate
distortions  in  incentives  through  their  influence  on  relative  prices  (of
both  commodities  and  factors  of production).  Moreover,  tax  revenues  are
often not sufficiently  buoyant  with respect  to growth  of output and
incomes  and may not adequately  serve  equity  objectives. Typically,  a
large  proportion  of  tax  revenues  is raised  through  taxes  on
international  trade,  particularly  imports,  and  excises. For  example,  in
1985  in low-income  countries,  38  percent  of tax  revenues  originated  from
taxes on international  trade,  with another 13 percent derived from
excises  (Table  8).- 44 -
Table  8
Composition  of  Tax  Revenues  for  Countries
Grouoed  by Income.  1975  and  1983 -/
Low-income  £/  Middle-Income  A/  Industrial  e/
Tax  Category  hI  1975  1985  1975  1985  1975  1985
Domestic  income  28  26  30  2  35  35
Individual  9  9  8  10  27  27
Corporate  18  15  17  17  7  7
Other  direct taxes  5  4  18  la  33  34
Social  security  1  1  12  11  29  31
Property  2  1  3  2  2  2
Domestic  commodity  28  3  27  i1  29  29
Sales,  VAT, turnover  13  17  9  13  16  17
Excises  13  13  12  12  10  10
International  trade  39  38  25  19  4  2
Import  25  28  20  17  4  2
Export  11  8  4  1  0  0
LI  Figures  are  unweighted  representing  the  average  patternl  for  countries  in
the  sample.
hi  Figures  for  subcategories  do  not  add  up to the  figure  for  each  category  due
to  the  presence  of smaller  unallocated  taxes.
.q/  Low-income  sample  includes  11  countries.
I/  Middle-income  sample  includes  36 countries.
e/  Industrial  market  includes  19  countries.
Source: World  Develogment  Report: 1988.
54.  Changes  in tax systems  which  reduce  distortions  in production
and  improve  investment/savings  incentives  can  go a  long  way in  effecting
structural  adjustment  and  contributing  to  economic  growth. Moreover,  by
broadening  the tax  base,  simplification, and strengthening tax
administration,  revenue  elasticity  and  equity  aspects  of the  tax  system
could be enhanced.  Thus, adjustment  programs increasingly  include
elements  of tax reform.  In designing  a tax  reform  package,  there  are
inevitably  tradeoffs  among various objectives --  revenue generation,
efficiency, equity, and administrative  simplicity.  Administrative
constraints  often  pose  significant  limitations  on the  overall  design  and- 45 -
the pace of reform  implementation.  Nevertheless,  theoretical  insights
and  experience  provide  broad  guidelines  for  reforming  tax  systems. The
contours  of desirable  change  include  the  following:
Shifting  away from taxation  of production  to taxing  consumption  in
the  form  of a  value  added  tax,  coupled  with  a few  excises  on luxury
items  so  as to  achieve  greater  equity.
Broadening  of personal  income  taxation  to include  income  from all
sources  with a top  marginal  rate  significantly  below  those  found  in
many industrial  and developing  countries;  very few exemptions  and
rates.
Simplifying  and rationalizing  of corporate  taxation  so as to  have  a
relatively  low  marginal  effective  rate and  neutrality  with respect
to the choice  of sectors,  assets  and the financing  composition  of
investment;  very few rates; elimination  of double taxation of
dividends.
Inflation  accounting  for  both  personal  and  corporate  taxes.
A reduction  and  simplification  of tariffs  based  on ad-valorem  rates
and  which  serve  protective  rather  than  revenue  purposes;  replacement
of  high tariffs  on luxury  goods  by excise  taxes.
A major  strengthening  of tax  administration  system.- 46 -
55.  While few countries  have carried  out successful  comprehensive  tax
reforms,  it is important  that  partial  reforms  be based on a sound  overall
design  of the  tax  system. In particular,  the  reforms  of international  trade
taxes  need to  be closely  coordinated  with that  of domestic  trade  taxes.
Experience  with  Tax  Reform  in  Adiustment  Programs
56.  Faced  with large  and  unsustainable  fiscal  deficits,  fundamental  tax
reform  in many developing  countries  has been tempered  by short-run  revenue
considerations.  Indeed,  given  the  urgency  of fiscal  deficit  reduction,  near-
term revenue-enhancement  measutes  have often  tended  to dominate  tax policy
initiatives  in recent  years. This  has often  involved  an increase  in excise
and international  trade  taxes,  because  of the  ease  with  which  such taxes  can
be administered.  In Malawi, for example, import duties and excises  on
selective  goods were increased  in the early 1980s.  Other countries  with
similar experiences  have included  Argentina,  Bangladesh,  Philippines,  and
Thailand  and more recently,  Morocco,  where a special  surtax  on imports  is
being increased.  These ad hoc changes,  however,  have adverse  incentive
implications  through  increased  protection  and  cascading  effects,  and  tend  to
further  complicate  the  tax  structure.
57.  The  trend  in tax  revenues  for  a  selected  group  of countries  is  shown
in Table  9.  With few  exceptions,  there  has not  been a significant  increase
in the tax/GDP ratio, further underscoring  the earlier observation  that
expenditures have borne  the main brunt of fiscal deficit reduction.
Maintaining  the  tax/GDP  ratio  has  often  been  achieved  by the  introduction  of- 47 -
Table  9
Government  Revenues  by Broad  Categories
(Percentage  of GDP)
Domestic  Domestic  Int'l
Direct  Indirect  Trade  Total  Non  Total
Country  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  TIaz  LM  Revenue
Chile
1982  9.0  12.3  1.4  22.7  9.0  31.7
1986  6.3  14.1  3.0  23.4  5.6  28.9
Colombia
1982  2.6  2.8  1.8  7.4  0.9  8.3
1986  3.3  3.5  2.2  9.6  0.5  10.1
C6te  d'voire
1982  4.1  5.6  10.1  21.3  6.4  27.7
1986  3.7  5.7  9.6  20.3  11.4  31.7
Jamaica
1982  11.9  8.9  3.0  23.9  0.9  24.8
1986  11.9  11.1  5.2  28.4  1.0  29.4
1982  6.5  8.2  5.0  19.7  3.4  23.1
1986  6.8  9.9  4.4  21.4  3.2  24.6
M1ala-i
1982  6.4  5.9  4.2  16.7  2.9  19.6
1986  7.1  6.4  3.5  17.1  4.5  21.6
Mexico
1983  10.6  5.6  0.5  16.8  1.0  17.8
1986  8.0  6.1  0.9  15.0  1.0  16.0
Morocco
1982  4.6  8.7  6.4  20.1  2.6  22.7
1986  5.0  8.1  4.2  17.9  3.8  21.7
Pakista
1982  2.9  4.9  5.9  13.6  2.9  16.5
1986  2.2  5.8  5.8  13.8  3.7  17.5
Thailand
1983  3.6  6.7  3.7  14.6  1.5  16.1
1986  3.4  7.9  3.5  15.6  1.5  17.1
Source: World  Bank  and  IMF  Data.- 48 -
ad hoc measures, as noted above.  Inelasticity  of tax systems in many
developing  countries  gives  rise  to the  need for  frequent,  ad hoc changes  in
the  taxes  rates  and/or  base  to  ensure  that  tax  revenues  increase  in  line  with
GDP.
58.  As part of trade liberalization  programs,  reform  of international
trade taxes has been the most common feature of tax changes aimed at
improving  resource  allocation. Generally,  the  focus  has  been on converting
specific  duties  to ad-valorem  rates  and reducing  the  level  and  variation  in
tariff  rates.  Converting  QRs to tariffs  has typically  been an accompanying
measure. Virtually  all SALs  and trade/industry  sector  adjustment  loans  have
contained  considerable  conditionality  with respect  to tariff  regimes  and,  by
and large,  significant  progress  has been made on this  front.  However,  in
some  cases (e.g.,  Kenya  in 1983),  trade  liberalization  has suffered  setbacks
in  part  because  of the  negative  revenue  consequences  of reduced  tariffs  at a
time  when imports  were declining  because  of a foreign  exchange  shortage. In
the  case  of Kenya, while  tariff reductions and  rationalization  were
initiated,  compensatory  revenue  measures  were  not  instituted.  In  other  cases
(e.g.,  Philippines  and  Thailand),  tariff  reform  was  not  undertaken  because  of
negative  revenue  consequences.  Removal  of export  taxes  on  agricultures  is  at
times impeded  by revenue  consequences,  particularly  as the imposition  of a
land tax as a substitute  encounters  powerful  political  opposition  (e.g.,
Argentina).
59.  Reform  of domestic  indirect  taxes  has been less  extensive  than in
the case of tariffs.  Several countries,  including  Indonesia,  Korea and
Turkey,  have in recent  years introduced  a VAT as the main instrument  for
rationalizing  their  system  of indirect  taxation. By now, more than thirty
developing countries have some form of VAT.  Some VATs apply to the- 49 -
manufacturing/import  stage  (e.g., Indonesia) while  others extend to
wholesale/retail  stage (e.g.,  Korea,  Turkey).  The experience  with VAT has
been favorable,  even in  terms  of short  run  revenue  response. While  the  Fund
has long advocated  the introduction  of a VAT as the most desirable  broad-
based,  efficient  form  of commodity  taxation,  the  Bank  has  generally  accorded
very limited  attention  to commodity  taxation  issues,  except  tariffs,  in its
economic  work and adjustment  lending. An important  exception  has been the
case of Turkey  where  the  introduction  of VAT  was explicitly  supported  in the
SALs to that country  as early  as in 1981.  Beginning  in the  mid-1980s,  the
Bank  has taken  a more active  role in advocating  VATs (e.g.,  the  Malawi  Tax
Study  of 1985;  Bangladesh: Adjustment  in the  80s  and Short-term  Prospects,
1988;  Tunisia  SAL  I).
60.  Progress in reforming  personal  and corporate  income  taxation  has
been  very limited. Two  broad  problem  areas  exist  in  most income  tax  systems
of developing  countries. First  is  the  presence  of  numerous  exemptions  and/or
incentives  which  are  often  intended  to stimulate  investment/savings  or serve
other  policy  objectives.  Such  provisions  reduce  the  tax  base  and  revenues  to
an extent  often  unknown  and,  in the  case of investment  incentives  which  are
pervasive  in some countries  (e.g.,  Morocco,  Turkey),  there is very little
empirical  evidence  that  they  produce  socially  desirable  results. The second
aspect  of income  taxation  where reform  is warranted,  particularly  in high
inflation  countries,  relates  to the absence  or inadequacy  of indexation  of
both income  and  assets. The  impact  of  high inflation  on revenue  can  also  be
negative  through  collection  lags  and  full  deductability  of interest  expenses.
The  low  share  of  income taxes  in overall tax revenues, enforcement
difficulties,  powerful  vested  interests,  and a genuine  desire  to influence
saving/investment  decisions  account  for the inertia  in streamlining  income
taxation.- 50 -
61.  There  have  been  only  a few  developing  countries  that  have  attempted
comprehensive  tax reforms.  Colombia  has had two major episodes  (1974  and
1986). More recently,  Indonesia  and  Mexico  have  had  major  overhauls  of their
tax systems. Indonesia's  reform  was particularly  noteworthy  in that it  was
n=  motivated  by a fiscal  crisis  but  was induced  largely  by the  government's
effort to reduce the dependence  of its revenue base on oil income and
increase  the low share (about  8 percent)  of non-oil  taxes to GNP over the
medium to longer term.  The reform, introduced  in 1983-84,  completely
overhauled  income  and  domestic  trade  taxation. Not  only  does  the  new  system
have a broader  base and is more neutral  and simpler  to administer,  it has
also  produced  significant  revenue  gains,  which in turn  have helped  to keep
the fiscal  deficit  within  manageable  limits  following  the sharp  decline  in
oil  prices  in 1986.  Indonesia's  tax  reform  was  very much  undertaken  on its
own  initiative  and  did not  form any  part  of explicit  or  implicit
conditionality  in its  dealing  with  the  Bank  (or  the  Fund).
V.  Growth-Oriented  Fiscal  Programs: Lessons  of  Experience
62.  Fiscal  adjustment  and reform  are  by nature  difficult  to design  and
implement  given  the complexity  of the  underlying  economic  and institutional
factors  as  well  as social  and  political  sensitivities.  The  discussion  in the
previous  section  points  to several  broad  conclusions  as to the nature  and
extent  of fiscal  adjustment  in  the  developing  countries  in  this  decade:51 -
Fiscal policy reforms have often been  triggered  by actual or
impending  budgetary and balance of payment crises.  Under such
circumstances,  short run considerations  have dominated  the policy
measures  introduced.
For  a  number  of  countries,  considerable  adjustment  has  occurred  with
respect  to reducing  the fiscal  deficit  and the external  deficit,
although  several  countries  experienced  a  reversal  on the  budget  side
after 1985.  As expected, the short run impact of budgetary
retrenchment has  generally been recessionary with  a fall in
investment  and  growth.
Reduction  of the fiscal  deficit  has  been achieved  primarily  through
expenditure  cutbacks,  particularly  in  public  investment.
Expenditure  cutbacks  relative  to  GDP  have  been  accompanied  by a  more
focussed  public  investment  programs,  often  in the  form  of a "core"
set of projects and activities  in high priority,  areas such as
infrastructure.  Improved  allocation  of recurrent  expenditures  has
also  been achieved  although  the reduction  and elimination  of some
subsidies  (e.g.,  fertilizers)  has  proven  to  be  more  difficult.
With a  few exceptions, revenue enhancement  has not been very
significant  because  the tax systems  often  lack  a sufficient  degree
of elasticity  and  the reduction  of imports  due to foreign  exchange
constraints  has  resulted in losses of tariff revenues--a  main- 52 -
component  of tax receipts. Indeed,  many countries  have introduced
ad hoc tax measures  of an undesirable  nature (on efficiency  and
incentive  grounds)  to maintain  or modestly  increase  their tax/GDP
ratios.
Fundamental  tax reform, except  for tariffs, has  not been a
significant  aspect  of fiscal  adjustment.
63.  Growth-oriented  adjustment  programs  entail  an approach  to fiscal
reforma  which goes  considerably beyond the purview of the traditional
stabilization approach  which emphasizes  measures aimed at reducing the
aggregate  demand. By definition,  fiscal  policy  changes  aimed  at augmenting
aggregate  supply  take  longer  to bring  about  the  desired  results.
Consequently,  adjustment  policies  accenting  fulndamental  fiscal  reform  require
a  medium term perspective. Countries  suffering  from severe  macroeconomic
imbalances  need, of course, to restore a reasonable  degree  of stability
before  structural  measures  can be put in place and expected  to elicit  the
desired responses.  However,  what constitutes  a  "reasonable  degree" of
macroeconomic  correction  depends on a number of factors,  including the
availability of external finance to support an appropriate  adjustment
program. Countries  committed  to fundamental  fiscal  reform--as  well as other
key policy areas--should  be able to avail themselves  of the necessary- 53 -
financial support within a time frame that allows them to initiate  and
sustain  the  process  of change. In  this  context,  the  tradeoff  between  a rigid
focus  on stabilization  and  adjustment  should  be recognized  and  considered. 23
64.  SALs remain the most appropriate  vehicle for supporting  fiscal
reform  because  of their  economy-wide  approach.  In principle,  there  is no
reason  why  a series  of fiscal-based  SALs  could  not  be designed  for  a country
willing to undertake  structural  and institutional  reforms  in the areas of
expenditure policy, taxation,  and public sector pricing.  Considerable
preparation  in the form  of studies  with a policy  focus  would,  however,  need
to  precede  such  lending  operations  for  them  to  be effective.  The  Bank  has in
recent  years  carried  out  many  "Public  Investment  (Expenditure)  Reviews",  some
of which  have served,  as noted  earlier,  as inputs  into SALs.  More sharply
focussed  studies  of this type,  including  those  on the revenue  side,  would
need to be undertaken to underpin carefully  the adjustment  programs  and
lending. SAL conditionality  would  need to be geared  towards  reform  actions
as opposed  to necessarily  short-run  improvements  in  key  macro  targets  (e.g.,
the budget  deficit).  In countries  where there is an acute stabilization
problem,  aggregate  demand  reduction  measures  would  also  need to  be included.
In any event, multi-year financing  commitment  would be required  to help
persuade  governments  to  undertake  the  reforms  and  to  sustain  them. 24
2./  The World Bank and  IMF are  increasingly recognizing the need fol-
refocussing  fiscal  reform  packages  to include  supply-side  measures  .an,
are proposing  a change  in its  policy  in this direction  as evidenced  i:.
recent  internal  policy  documents.
24/  See S. Fischer,  "Issues  in Medium-Term  Macroeconomic  Adjustment",  Th1
World  Bank  Research  Observer,  VL.1,  July  1986,  for  a  discussion  of  multi-
year structural  adjustment  programs  and  financing.- 54-
65.  Greater Bank involvement  in adjustment  lending based on fiscal
reform and the Fund's growing concern with growth-oriented  adjustment
programs  imply  a greater  need for  coordination  and  collaboration  between  the
two institutions  in designing  mutually-reinforcing  operations.  In this
context,  there  should  be a clear  understanding  that  fiscal  policy  issues  are
a matter  of concern  for both institutions  and could  be the basis for the
lending  operations  of either  entity. The increased  awareness  of the  need  for
growth-oriented  adjustment  programs in general,  and the central  role of
fiscal  policy  in their  design  implies  that  the  Bank  will  be required  to  take
a much  more  active  role  in this  area.- 55 -
BOX  Tarzetting  the  Budaet  Deficit: Clarifving  Concepts
The fiscal deficit is a very important  component  of the policy
package  in adjustment  programs.  In order to monitor  its size, adjustment
programs  usually  set  targets  on net  domestic  credit  to the  government  or the
private sector as well as on commercial  borrowing  by the government  (or
public sector) from abroad.  To avoid the possibility  of the government
borrowing  excessively  from the non-bank  public,  adjustment  programs  often
also include  targets  on the  size  of the  deficit,  thereby  limiting  the  need
for  such  borrowing. This  is done  in  order  to ensure  that  the  private  sector
is  not  crowded-out  for  financial  resources.
In designing  adjustment  programs,  do the  commonly  used concepts  of
the  budget  deficit  provide  an  accurate  indication  of the  fiscal  stance  of the
public sector  viz-a-vis the rest of the economy  or are they misleading?
Would it be useful to complement  the standard  budget deficit  with other
measures? These  issues  are  often  decided  by the  availability  of data. But,
the  discussions  on these  questions  have  improved  understanding  of the  impact
of the government  on the economy;  and have shown  that it is important  to
understand  the  limitations  of the  commonly  used  measures.
Earlier programs often only look at the public finances  of the
central  government. The central  government's  deficit  or its  net borrowing
requirement  was defined  as central  government  expenditure  net of central
government revenue.  This was  obviously an insufficient  measure as a
substantial  part of government  activity  consists  of public  enterprises  and
state  of local  governments. It is now common  to measure  the  net financing
requirement  of the  entire  public  sector  called  the  consolidated  public  sector- 56 -
deficit  or the  public  sector  borrowing  requirement  (PSBR). This  measures  the
net use of financial  resources  by the public  sector  and consequently  its
impact  on the  balance  of payments,  inflation,  credit  to the  private  sector
and  domestic  interest  rates.
In dealing with high  inflation countries the concept of the
operational  deficit or inflation-corrected  deficit is very useful.  The
operational  deficit  is defined  as the PSBR minus the inflation  correction
part  of interest  payments. This  is  necessary  because  with  high  inflation  the
real  value of the government's  debt has fallen,  and  a part of the interest
payments  (which should be  deducted) only compensates  debt-holders  for
inflation.  A  few recent programs have used this as a  supplementary
criterion. In countries  with a large  debt  overhang  it is useful  to  measure
the non-interest or  primary  deficit.  This is ar.  indicator of the impact of
fiscal  policy  in a particular  year on the  public  sector's  net indebtedness;
and  provides  an assessment  of trends  in  underlying  government  accounts  net  of
the  inherited  debt  problem.
Another  concept  sometimes  found  useful is the structural  deficit.
This  concept is  suggested in cases where  temporary factors such as
fluctuations  in commodity  prices,  sale of public  assets (privatization),  a
tax  amnesty  or for  that  manner  any  fluctuation  in  GDP  from  trend  values  leads
to a temporary  change  in public  finances  without  changing  underlying  trends
in government  expenditure  or revenue.  It can be particularly  useful in
avoiding a commonly observed problem in many developing countries of
increasing  expenditures  during  a commodity  boom followed  by large  deficits
when prices  fall.  Automatic  adjustors  are often  specified  to the overall
deficit  or credit  ceilings  to  account  for  unexpected  shortfalls  or a  bonanza.*  57 -
A  more  difficult  issue  associated  with  targetting  arises  from
distinguishing  ex-ante between what will be called  here the first  order
deficit  and the subsequent  increase  in the  deficit  brought  about  by changes
in inflation  and domestic  interest  rates  or for that  matter  other  channels
which  affect  the  budget  deficit. For  example,  accelerating  inflation  erodes
revenues  because of collection  lags, tax evasion  or lack of indexation,
creating  even larger  deficits. This is  known  as the  Tanzi  effect. Studies
show  that  the  impact  of these  lags  can  be large  in  high inflation  countries.
A similar  situation  arises  when the government  finances  its  deficit  through
domestic  borrowing.  Now  interest  rates  rise due  to inflationary
expectations,  resulting  in large  interest  payments,  which in turn  raise  the
deficit  even  further. Turkey,  and  Brazil  provides  a striking  example  of this
type  of  vicious  spiral  in  domestic  interest  rates,  domestic  interest  payments
and  the  deficit.
What does this imply  for targetting  budget  deficits?  The first-
order deficit reduction  required  for macro-stability  is smaller  than the
deficit  shown  by the  PSBR.  This is  because  a part of the  deficit  reduction
will come automatically  as the rate  of interest  and inflation  fall  with an
initial  reduction  in first-order  deficit  (Note  that  a fall  in inflation  will
have other  consequences  such as a fall in revenue  from the inflation  tax).
The PSBR can over-estimate  the reduction  in the fiscal  deficit  required  to
correct  macro imbalances. It can therefore  lead to recommendations  which
require  larger  expenditure  reduction  and revenue  enhancing  measures  than  are
warranted.58 -
A  final  measure  of the deficit  that is often  used in evaluating
government  finances  is the current  deficit  i.e. current  expenditure  net of
current  revenues. A surplus  on this  account  shows  that the  government  is a
net  saver. A deficit  shows  that  the  government  is  using  a part  of the  taxed
savings  of the  private  sactor  for its  current  expenditure  needs.  In general
it is desirable to increase  government  savings  (reduce  current  deficit).
However,  one must be careful.  If this is brought  about for example  by
reducing  maintenance  expenditures  to increase  investments  or by reducing
current  outlays  on public  health  services  to build a  hospital  its overall
impact  may  not  be  beneficial.- 59 -
Table  1
Definitions  of the  Budget  Deficit
Central  Government  - Central  Government  - Central  Government
Deficit  Expenditure  Revenue
Public  Sector  Borrowing  - Total  Public  - Total  Public  Revenue
Requirements  (PSBR)  Expenditure
Operation  Deficit  - PSBR  - Inflation  corrected
(inflation  corrected  part  of interest-payment
deficit)
Primary  Deficit  - PSBR  - interest-payments
(nun-interest  deficit)
Structural  Deficit  - PSBR  - temporary  factors
(commodity  booms
or  busts,  droughts
sale  of  assets)
First-Order  Deficit  - PSBR  - Tanzi  Effect  - effect  of
inflationary  expectations
on interest  rates
Current  Deficit  - Current  Expenditure  - Total  Revenue- 60  -
Appendix  A: Table  A.1
Effutlvw  Rserve Rsstr.nts  an Oposits  In
DOUstic  Bualng  Wsyt  a/
1981  1982  1983  1984  198S  1988
Hlgh
ArgutIra  0.148  0.51  0.797  O.5S  0.483  0.222
uruImy  0.085  0.178  0.422  0.341  0.333  0.348
Colomia  0.422  0.398  0.359  0.351  0.34  NA
iOu  0.473  0.438  0.454  0.830  0.501  0.m
Iblawl  0.154  0.152  0.141  0.284  0.308  0.484
&bxlao  0.467  0.609  0.632  0.566  0.413  0.302
Turkey  0.317  0.27  0.304  0.294  0.257  0.215
_uIca  0.158  0.024  0.118  0.270  0.278  0.393
Moderate
BrazIl  0.185  0.210  0.167  0.150  0.106  0.185
Baglad.ah  0.10  0.098  0.093  O.94  0.0  0.091
Indormsla  0.205  0.248  0.163  0.161  0.159  NA
Nigeria  0.137  0.175  0.098  0.070  0.0a0  0.Ot8
ivory Cost  0.081  0.048  0.058  0.072  0.124  0.140
I(Mys  0.085  0.105  0.071  0.077  0.098  0.116
PakIstan  0.101  0.091  0.089  0.121  0.105  0.100
Phllppilus  0.114  0.090  0.108  0.132  0.139  0.193
Zabla  0.177  0.148  0.162  0.195  0.211  0.284
Tunisia  0.039  0.023  0.028  0.033  0.028  0.018
Korea  0.054  0.069  0.056  0.040  0.040  0.043
MDrooco  0.023  0.018  0.015 0.025  0.017  0.048
Thai  lad  0.048  0.041  0.039  0.030  0.040  0.037
Source:  Intnatinal  Filncial  Statistics
a/  Line  20  divided  by sum  of  Line  24  & 25.- 61 -
Appendix A:  Table  A.2
AVERAGE INTEREST  RATE ON PUBLIC-SECTOR  DOMESTIC DEBT
Per cent per annum
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
I.  Hyperinflation
Argentina
Interest rate A/  19.9  30.9  19.2  10.4  7.2  11.2
Consumer prices k/  100.8  104.5  104.5  343.8  626.7  673.4
Brazil
Interest rates  35.4  89.0  131.3  136.7  250.2  270.4
Consumer prices  92.8  98.6  100.4  133.4  188.8  224.6
II.  High Inflation
Mexico
Interest rate  10.8  16.9  21.7  28.5  37.3  32.6
Consumer prices  26.3  27.9  58.9  101.9  645.4  57.7
Philippines
Intereat  rate  12.0  11.9  13.8  14.2  28.5  33.2
Consumer  prices  18.2  13.1  10.2  10.0  50.4  21.7
III.  Low Inflation
Indonesia
Interest  rate  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0
Consumer prices  18.5  12.2  9.5  11.8  10.4  3.7
Korea
Interest  rate  11.6  10.5  8.8  7.2  9.1  7.8
Consumer prices  28.7  21.3  7.3  3.4  2.3  1.7
Venezuela
Interest rate  7.1  8.4  11.8  13.2  13.5  13.0
Consumer prices  21.5  16.2  9.5  6.2  12.2  10.7
A/  Derived from comparing the annual interest  expense on domestic
indebtedness  incurred  by the non-financial  public sector  with the
estimated  mid-year stock of its  domestic debt.
k  Annual increase  as a percentage.
Source:  Helmut Reisen and A. van Trotsenburg "Developing  Country Debt:
The Budgetary and Transfer Problem,"  OECD, Paris, 1988.Appendix  A:  Figure  A.1
CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITURE





io  - 0%_ 
10
DE  ED  HE  SS  ES,  AF  iC  OP  1E  S
136
ZZ  Ew  i  L  Iw  Up-Mid  Indust
DE  Defence  AF  Agriculture,  Forestry,  Fishing,
ED  Education  and  Hunting
HE  Health  TC  - Transportation  and Communication
SS  Social  Security  and  Welfare  OP  =  Other  Purposes
ES  - Economic  Services  TE  Total  Expenditure
SD - Overall  Surplus/Deficit
-.  "n  i  ket  Oriented  DevelopingA:
CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  CURRENT  REVENUE




IL  20  - z
IL
0
K  15 
10  .0
IPC  SSC  DCS  IIT  *T  CNR  CTR  TCR
1983
gZo  LOW  1  '  Low-Mid  Up-Mid  Indust
IPC  = Taxes  on  income,  profit,  and  OT - Other  taxes
capital  gains  CNR - Current  nontax  revenue
SSC  Social  security  contributions  CTR - Current  tax  revenue
DCS - Domestic  taxes  on  goods  and  TCR - Total  current  revenue
services
ITT  - Taxes  on international  trade
and transactions
Source: See  Lindbeck,  Assar (1986): "Public  Finance  for  Market  Oriented  Developing
Countries,"  Mimeo,  The  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.- 64
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anand,  R.,  Chhibber,  A.,  van  Wijnbergen,  S. 1988.  "External  Balance,  Fiscal
Policy  and  Growth  in  Turkey",  PPR  Working  Paper  No.  WPS86,  August  1988.
Balassa,  B. 1988.  "Public  Finance  and  Economic  Development".  PPR  Working  Paper
No.  WPS31,  July  1988,  World  Bank.
Buiter,  W. 1985.  "A  Guide  to  Public  Sector  Debt  and  Deficits",  Economic
Eolic2Z  1,  November:  13-19
Cardoso,  E.  and  Dornbusch,  R. 1987. "Brazils'  Tropical  Plan".  American
Economic  Review  Papers  and  Proceedings  77,  May.
Chhibber,  A. 1985.  "Taxation  and  Aggregate  Savings: An Econometric
Analysis for Three Sub-Saharan  African Countries".  CPD Discussion
Pa2er  Series  1985-35,  Washington,  DC:  World  Bank.
Corbo,  V.,  Goldstein,  H. and  Khan,  M. eds.  1987.  Growth  Oriented  Adjustment
Progxams,  Washington,  DC:  World  Bank
Feltenstein,  A. and  Farhadian,  Z. 1987.  "Fiscal  Policy,  Monetary  Targets
and the Price  Level in a Centrally  Controlled  Economy:  The Case  of
China". Journal  of  Money.  Credit.  and  Banking  19,  2.
Fischer,  S.  1986.  "Issues  in  Medium-Term  Macroeconomic  Adjustment",  Ihe
World  Bank  Research  Observer  1,  July.
International  Monetary  Fund.  1988.  "Fiscal  Aspects  of  Adjustment  Programs",
SM/88/53,  Washington,  DC.
International  Monetary  Fund.  Various  Years,  International  Financial
Statistics.  Washington,  DC.
Lindbeck,  A. 1986.  "Public  Finance  for  Market  Oriented  Developing  Countries",
Mimeo,  World  Bank.
Pinto,  B. 1987.  "Black  Market  Premia,  Exchange  Rate  Unification  and  Inflation
in  Sub-Saharan  Africa",  Mimeo,  Uorld  Bank.
Please,  S. 1967.  "Savings  Through  Taxation: Reality  or  Mirage". Finance  and
Develogment.
Reisen,  H. and  van  Trotsenburg,  A. 1988.  "Developing  Country  Debt: The
Budgetary  and  Transfer  Problems",  Paris:  OECD.
Tanzi,  V. 1977.  "Inflation,  Lags  in  Collection  and  the  Real  Value  of Tax
Revenues". IMF  Staff  Pager  24.
World  Bank.  1987.  "Bank  Treatment  of  Subsidies",  Mimeo,  Washington,  DC.- 65 -
World  Bank.  1988.  World  Debt  Tables  1987-88,  Washington,  DC.
World  Bank.  1988.  World  Development  Report  1988,  Washington,  DC.
World  Bank.  1988.  "Turkey: External  Debt,  Fiscal  Policy  and  Growth",  Green











1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
Year






so  -- '  70  -
60
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
Year
0  ARGENTlNA  +  GHANA  O  MEXICOPPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS107 A Review  of  World  Bank  Lending  for
Electric  Power  Mohan  Munasinghe
Joseph  Gilling
Melody  Mason
WPS108  Some  Considerations  In  Collecting  Data
on  Household  Energy  Consumptlon  L.  Leltmann
WPS109 Improving  Power  System  Efficiency  In
the  Developing  Countries  Through
Performance  Contracting  Philip  Yates
WPSIIO Impact  of Lower  Oil  Prices  on
Renewable  Energy  Technologies  E.  Terrado
M.  Mendis
K.  Fitzgerald
WPSIII Recent  World  Bank  Activities  in  Energy  Industry  and  Energy
Department
WPS112 A Visual  Overview  of  the  World  Oil
Markets  Kay McKeough
Jose  Escay
Sompheap  Sem
WPS113 Public  Sector  Pay  and Employment
Reform  Barbara  Nunberg  October  1988  J.  Cheeseman
61703
WPS114 Africa  Region  Population  Projections
1988-89 edition  My  T.  Vu  October  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Eduard  Bos  31091
Rodolfo  A.  Bulatao
WPS115 Asia  Region  Population  Projections
1988-89 edition  My  T.  Vu  October  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Eduard  Bos  31091
Rodolfo  A.  Bulatao
WPS116 Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean
Region  Population  Projections
1988-89 edition  My  T.  Vu  October  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Eduard Bos  31091
Rodolfo  A.  Bulatao
WPS117 Europe,  Middle  East,  and  North  Africa
(EMN)  Region  Population  Projections
1988-89 edition  My  T.  Vu  October  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Eduard  Bos  31091
Rodolfo  A.  BulataoPPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS118 Contract-Plans  and  Public
Enterprise  Performance  John  Nellis  October  1988  R.  Malcolm
61707
WPS119 Recent  Developments  in  Commodity
Modeling: A  World  Bank  Focus  Walter  C. Labys  October  1988  A.  Daruwala
33716
WPS120 Public  Policy  and  Private  Investment
In  Turkey  Ajay  Chhibber  October  1988  A. 8halia
Sweder  van  Wljnbergen  60359
WPS121 Commercial  Bank  Provisioning  Against
Claims  on Developing  Countries  Graaam  Bird  October  1988  1. Holloman-Will
33729
WPS122  Import  Demand  In  Developing
Countries  Riccardo  Faini  November  1988  K.  Cabana
Lant  Pritchett  61539
Fernando  Clavljo
WPS123 Export  Supply,  Capacity  and  Relative
Prices  Riccardo  Fainl  November  1988  K.  Cabana
61539
WPS124 International  Macroeconomic
Adjustment,  1987-1992:  A World
Model  Approach  Robert  E.  King  November  1988  K. Adams
Helena  Tang  33738
WPS125 The  Effects  of Financial  Liberaliza-
tion  on Thailand,  Indonesia  and
the  Philippines  Christophe  Chamley  October  1988  A.  Bhalla
Qaizar  Hussaln  60359
WPS126 Educating  Managers  for  Business  and
Goverment: A  Review  of International
Experience  Samuel  Paul  November  1988  E.  Madrona
John  C. Ickis  61711
Jacob  Levitsky
WPS127 Linking  Development,  Trade,  and
Debt  Strategies  in  Highly  Indebted
Countries  Ishac  Diwan  November  1988  1.  Diwan
33910
WPS128 Public  Finances  in  Adjustment  Programs  Ajay  Chhibber  December  1988  A.  Bhalla
J.  Khalilzadeh-Shirazl  60359